First Draft of my PhD Entrance Paper Available
September 29, 2008 · by Loden Jinpa · Buddhism, Essays, Philosophy
** Updated 2nd October 2008 **
Thanks to the wonderful feedback I have received, i have updated the essay. The changes are minor, although there was some ambiguity in some of the arguments. These arguments have had a revision or two.
Below is a paragraph from the essay I wrote defending Tsong khapa’s theory of illusory-like persons. I’m looking for feedback and comments on the essay so I can improve it before final submission. The quality of the paper is the determining factor on which I will be offered a Masters or a PhD. It is the first draft and it DOES need work.
In this essay, I will argue, not only did Tsong khapa correctly understand the
Nagarjuna and Candrakirti emptiness thesis put forward in their Madhyamaka
treatises Mulamadhyamakakarika and Madhyamakavatara respectfully, but he also
added considerably to the debate on the nature of the two truths, by positing validly
established conventional phenomena. Therefore, I will defend Tsong Khapa’s
theory of illusory-like persons and show that not only is his presentation correct, but
that positing intrinsic essence in persons is incoherent. I will also argue, that
although intrinsic essence in persons and phenomena does not exist within either
domain of the two truths, still nonexistence does not entail. I will do this by arguing
that illusory-like persons and phenomena can be validly established within the
domain of what the world holds to exist, and that persons and phenomena are not
simply mere fictional constructs of a deluded ignorant mind.
Here is the link to the essay in pdf format.
Domain of the Illusory: Tsong khapa’s Theory of Illusory-like Persons

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