Thesis Topic Change

I’ve changed the topic of my thesis because (1) I believe it is a more contemporary field of research, (2) Tsong Khapa had a lot to say about this topic, and (3) I am very interested in this field. Below is my preliminary research plan.

Thesis Title:
Domain of the Illusory: Non-Egological Approach to Phenomenal Personhood.

Literature Review:
This study of the non-egological approach to personhood focuses on the five main philosophical works by the 14th CE Tibetan philosopher Tsong Khapa. The primary source material for this study is the following (Tibetan versions): (1) Special Insight section of “Great Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment”, (2) An Ocean of Reasoning: A Thorough Exposition of Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, (3) Essence of Eloquence: A Treatise Distinguishing Between the Provisional and the Definitive Meanings, (4) Special Insight section of “Middle Exposition of the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment” and (5) Elucidation of the Intention: A Thorough Exposition of Madhyamakāvatarā.

In this study, I will claim that an implicit thread of a two-tiered non-egological exegesis of persons begins with Tsong Khapa, and ends in the Indian Madhyamaka philosophical tradition founded by Nāgārjuna in the 2nd CE. In his canonical Madhyamaka treatise Mūlamadhyamakakārikā Nāgārjuna lays out a formulation for the nature of reality that consists of all phenomena having two natures. This doctrine of the Two Truths (satyadvaya, bden gnyis) – a Conventional Truth (saṃvṛtisatya, kun rdzob bden pa) and an Ultimate Truth (paramārthasatya, don dam bden pa) – which are two natures of the same entity, is the conceptual framework for which Tsong Khapa lays out his approach to metaphysics. I too shall adopt this two-tiered approach in order to resolve the on-going tension between the egological and non-egological approaches to personal identity and first-person experience, by placing the discussion within the framework of a conventional discourse and an ultimate discourse, thereby making sense of the theory of anātman or non-self and obvious worldly first person experiences.

Tsong Khapa interests me as a philosopher because I think he understood Candrakīrti analysis of Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā correctly, took the soteriological significance of first-person experience seriously, and paid particular attention to its articulation. While Tsong Khapa himself would say he put forward no new thesis of persons, his reading of Candrakīrti’s gloss of Nāgārjuna’s Two Truths doctrine is unique. I therefore hope to show the cogency of Tsong Khapa’s exegesis of persons by tracing his enterprise back into the Indian Madhyamaka tradition of Nāgārjuna via Candrakīrti. I will do this by investigating Candrakīrti’s Supplement to the ‘Middle Way’ (Madhyamakāvatāra) along with his Auto-Commentary on the Supplement to the ‘Middle Way’ (Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya).

However, Tsong Khapa was not without his critics. Foremost on this list from a rival school of Tibetan Buddhism was another philosopher by the name of Gorampa bSod nams Seng ge (1429-1489). Gorampa had sharply apposed views to Tsong Khapa and I will therefore analyse his critique of Tsong Khapa’s hermeneutics by investigating his polemical philosophical work entitled Distinguishing between Views (lta ba’I shan ‘byed). I will also investigate another contemporary of Tsong Khapa from the same school of Tibetan Buddhism as Gorampa, namely Shakya Chokden shakya mchog ldan(1428-1507). Shakya Chokden‘s Madhyamaka texts included in this study will be: Drop of Nectar of Definitive Meaning: Entering the Gate to the Essential points of the Two Truths (bden pa gnyis kyi gnas la ‘jug pa nges don bdud rtsi things pa) and Great Ship of Discrimination that Sails into the Ocean of Definitive Meaning: A Treatise Differentiating the Systems of Prasañgika and Svātantrika Madhyamaka (dbu ma thal rang gi grub mtha’I rnam par dbye ba’I bstan bcos nges don gyi rgya mtshor ‘jug pa’i rnam dpyod kyi gru chen).

Moreover, this study will include analysis of the contemporary views both from Buddhologists and analytic philosophers. In particular I will look at the work of: Professor Mark Siderits: Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy. Dr. Miri Albahri’s Analytical Buddhism: The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self. As well as the work of the contemporary phenomenologists Dan Zahari and Evan Thompson.

Research Questions:

The objective of this study is to research the cogency of a non-egological approach to self and phenomenal personhood.

My claim is that “self” or “persons” do not possess any kind of absolute ontological status, that is, the appearance of an objective referent of a self, person or “I” are non-existent imaginaries. Moreover, any notion that an invariant property of any kind is that which binds diachronic and synchronic first-person experience is an incoherent thesis, and like-wise a non-existent imaginary.

However, I will claim that despite this it is still possible to posit self, persons and I, existing, in a sense truly, as mere contingent phenomena within the framework of a kind of dynamic system. I will do this by arguing that what is being rejected here is not the existence of self or persons, but rather the existence of (1) a non-fabricated objective agent of experience, (2) any notion of an invariant or variant property of any kind, at any level of discourse which is the “self” or is acting as a “self” and (3) intrinsic identity at any level. I will thereby show that from within the framework of conventional discourse, phenomena such as persons are merely contingent, and that this schema leaves intact functional first-person experience.

Thus the non-egological exegesis of personhood when couched in a Two Truths discourse as first laid out by Nāgārjuna 2nd CE, further clarified by Candrakīrti 7th CE and developed by Tsong Khapa 14th CE is cogent.

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Homage to Compassion Without Dividing its Types

Tsong khapa tells us that unlike many other Buddhist texts where it is common to find respect paid to Buddhas or Manjushri, Candrakirti chooses to praise compassion instead. The purpose of this is to emphasize the method side of the path to enlightenment such as the first five of the six perfections – generosity, patience, ethics, joyous effort and concentration. Candrakirti also claims that compassion is the root cause of Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, Hearers and Solitary Realizers.

In the beginning of his treatise Madhyamakavatara we find the following two verses:

Hearers and Solitary Realizers are born from Buddhas.
Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas.
The mind of compassion, non-dual understanding,
And the altruistic mind of enlightenment
Are the causes of the Children of Conquerors.

Mercy along is seen as the seed
Of a Conqueror’s rich harvest,
As water for its development, and as
Ripening in a state of long enjoyment.
Therefore at the start I praise compassion.

Gendun Drup, the first Dalai Lama, in a short commentary to Tsong khapa’s Illumination called A Mirror for the Illumination of the Thought tells us: the realizations of the Hearers (shravakas) and Solitary Realizers (pratyekabuddhas) arise through the practice of dependent origination. The understanding of dependent origination comes from hearing it from a Buddha. Hence, Hearers and Solitary Realizers are born from Buddhas.

One may ask: does it follow that Bodhisattvas must become Hearers before entering into the practices of the Bodhisattvas? Tsong khapa and Gendun Drup are very clear on this point. Buddhas are born from Bodhisattvas in the sense that a Buddha originates from the Bodhisattva with whose personality theirs is continuous. Through practicing the meditations to enlightenment the Bodhisattva and the resultant experience of Buddhahood are causally contiguous.

In Illumination Je Rinpoche raises a possible objection saying: Someone (kha cig) says: isn’t “conqueror child” an epithet for Bodhisattvas? If so, how can a Bodhisattva be the bearer of a Buddha? For it is impossible that the father of a child be the child’s child. Tsong khapa answers this by stating the following:  Bodhisattva X is the substantial cause of Buddha Y, that is, the substance or the continuum of the subtle mind of Bodhisattva X becomes the continuum of the subtle mind Buddha Y. Further on he says: “The state of Buddhahood is only attained through one’s formerly having developed the state of a Bodhisattva on the path of learning”.

One may ask: why is Tsong khapa raising this objection here as it seems a straight forward claim that X and Y are causally related. We need to remind ourselves here of Candrakirti’s original intent when composing Madhyamakavatara. In India at that time there was a widely held misconception that the only requirement for a spiritual aspirant to achieve enlightenment was wisdom. That is, meditate on emptiness and enlightenment would ensue. Candrakirti’s treatise explicitly presents the causal relationship between the resultant state of Buddhahood and compassion. Therefore, Tsong khapa, like a masterful chess player setting up the pieces four moves ahead of his opponent, is maneuvering his philosophical arguments in such a way that it will be clear that compassion is the cause of a Bodhisattva, and it therefore follows: compassion is the root cause of enlightenment, not wisdom.

Of course, there is an implicit caveat here: The fully developed compassion spoken of in Buddhist thought is in turn generated from a thorough understand of the conditioned existence that all beings are inflicted by suffering, and this in turn can only be generated by understanding emptiness. For more in this see my essay: Is Wisdom Really Necessary In Order To Generate Compassion?

Gendun Drup in his Mirror for the Illumination of the Thought speaks of this causal relationship thus:

It is fitting for the Glorious Candrakirti to pay homage to compassion at the beginning, for its production is like the excellent harvest of the Victorious ones¹. Compassion is important at the beginning of the practice like a seed, it is important in the middle like water for its development, and it is important at the time of the result like enjoyment of its ripening.

This closely follows Candrakirti’s own thoughts in verse 1.2 of Madyamakavatara where it says:

Since mercy itself is accepted as the seed of this excellent harvest
Of the Conquerors, as water for development and
Like the ripening in a state of long enjoyment.
I therefore, praise compassion at the beginning.

The mind of compassion is the root cause of a future Buddha because it is this mind that is the initial motive for one to engage the path. That is to say, by clearly seeing how beings undergo suffering, and by understanding the causes of suffering one thinks: I will free all beings from suffering.

Compassion nurtures ones practice like water, and is the causal link through which one continues to practice the six perfections – generosity, ethics, patience, joyous effort, concentration and wisdom – thereby one’s development of the stages continues stage by stage, in a step by step process underpinned by the compassionate wish to free all beings from conditioned existence.

Because of this compassionate wish one is able to enjoy the fruits of practice, that is, enlightenment. This is true because it is compassion that is the driving force, the rocket fuel for practice that serves as basic motivation for engaging the path. According to many, without compassion one would simply stop at personal nirvana.

However, it is important to understand that Candrakirti and Tsong khapa are not speaking of simple empathy here. The fully developed compassion spoken of in Buddhism is not mere empathy, although empathy is its cause.

In the next article we will enumerate the different types of compassion.

Footnotes:

1. this is an honorific epithet for all Buddhas [go back]

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Introduction to the Illumination of the Thought

Introduction

In the introduction of Illumination of the Thought, Tsong khapa pays homage to the Buddha and the Madhyamaka lineage gurus, that is, the Indian pandits who expounded the Middle Way philosophy of emptiness and dependent-arising.

May I always be protected by the King of subduers,
Sun of all teachers, treasure of all good explanations
Of the profound and vast, unusual friend of all the world,
Eye revealing the good path on the three levels.

May I always receive the blessed empowerment
From guru Manjughosha, source of profundity
In the retinue of countless Conquerors, unequaled
In proclaiming the lion’s roar of right discourse supreme.

Homage from my heart to the prophesied Nagarjuna,
Who explained as it is the middle way of dependent-arising,
Free from extremes, the mind essence of the Sugatas
In the past, present, and future. Hold me then with the hook of mercy.

Homage to the feet of the glorious Aryadeva,
Who ascended to high rank through that protector’s precepts,
Clarifying for migrators what he had realized,
Attaining dominion of discourse teaching the good path.

I bow down with my head to the feet of Buddhapalita,
Who accomplished the word of the revered Manjughosha,
Illuminated the final thought of the Superior,
And went to a place of knowledge Bearer adepts.

Homage to the honorable Candrakirti and Shantideva,
Who completely and perfectly revealed the path
Of the great sage, subtle and hard to realize,
The extraordinary essentials of Nagarjuna’s system.

I have seen well with the eye of stainless intelligence
All the meanings of the uncommon essentials
In the tenets of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva
And commentaries of the three great charioteers.

In order to remove the correction by the pollutions
Of interpretations by most who sought to teach this system
And because others have requested, I will explain at length
In full and correctly the Supplement to the Middle Way.

The first three lines describe the qualities of the Buddha. The word profound here refers to the teachings of emptiness, while vast refers to the teachings of compassion, generosity, patience and so on. Unusual friend of the world is an epithet of the Buddha. Sun of all teachers shows the Buddha is like the sun, illuminating all the teachings and eliminating ignorance as sun light eliminates darkness.

By praising the Buddha and the lineage lamas in this way, Tsong khapa is placing his work within the historical framework of those come before him. He is implicitly indicating that what will be said has been said before.

In the last two verses Tsong khapa is saying he has studied the treatise and commentaries by Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, and the three masters – Buddhapalita, Candrakirti and Shantideva. While the last verse is a promise to complete the composition of the text regardless of what difficulties may arise.

As a side note, the last verse typically called the promise to compose is a device used by many Tibetan authors. By promising to complete a text they are in effect creating the cause via motivation for this to actually occur.

Meaning of the Title

The title of Candrakirti’s treatise is Madhyamakavatara while his own commentary to this is Madhyamakavatara bhashyam nama. In English this is Explanation of the Supplement to the ‘Middle Way’, while in Tibetan transliteration it is dbu ma la ‘jug pa ‘i bshad pa zhes bya ba¹ and can be translated as either Supplement or Engaging in the Middle Way. The Tibetan word ‘jug pa literally means “engage”. However, an appropriate translation here is “supplement” as Candrakirti supplements Nagarjuna’s treatise by including the vast practices of compassion and so on. Tsong khapa, in turn, clarifies Candrakirti’s thought.

‘Middle Way’ in the title should be known to refer to Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Madhyamakashastra) because when citing Nagarjuna’s Fundamental Wisdom Candrakirti does so by giving it the name The Middle Way. Furthermore, Bhavaviveka in his text Lamp for Wisdom (Prajnapradipa) tells us that the verbal root, that is, the “ka” of Madhyamaka indicates a treatise of the middle way. For Tsong khapa, the word Madhyamaka in the title should be understood to refer to Nagarjuna’s treatise not a person who follows the Middle Way or the tenets of the Middle way. I have heard that Madhyamaka in sanskrit grammar is a noun, whereas Madhyamika is a pronoun. Tsong khapa does not mention this in his text.

Nagarjuna’s treatise extensively explains ultimate truth in Fundamental Wisdom, even more so than Candrakirti. However, his treatise covers mainly ultimate truth and not the conventional. Tsong khapa says that Candrakirti supplements Fundamental Wisdom in two equally important ways. Firstly, Candrakirti composed the Supplement in order to show it is not suitable to explain the meaning of the Fundamental Wisdom in accordance with the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka or the Cittamatra schools. The Cittamatra school holds that there are no external phenomena, that is, everything is mere mind. In the tsam is mere or only and sems means mind, hence the name Mind Only school. While the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka school hold that while things do not exist truly they nonetheless exist inherently or from their own side².

Secondly, it supplements the Fundamental Wisdom from the viewpoint of the practices of compassion, ethics, patience, generosity and so forth. The practices of developing these qualities within ones continuum are collectively known as the practices of the vast. While developing ones insight into the nature of reality or emptiness is known as the profound. Together they are known as the practices of method and wisdom.

Obeisance of the Translators

At the beginning of Candrakirti’s text there is a line “homage to youthful Manjushri”

Tsong khapa has the following to say about this:

“Since this book presents knowledge about the ultimate (pramartha-abhidharma), the training in wisdom is central. Therefore, the translators paid homage to Manjushri in accordance with the former partitioning of Buddha’s words.”³

In the next article we will begin to look at the actual meaning of the text, starting with Tsong khapa’s Homage to compassion

Footnotes:

1. For those of you who wish to see the Tibetan characters, copy and paste that text into the textbox at this website and click the translate button. [go back]
2. if your confused at this point, don’t worry we will cover this in more detail in chapter six. For now, just be content with hearing the names of these schools, when you hear them again you wont seem so foreign [go back]
3. The three scriptural collections of knowledge, sutras and discipline. [go back]

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Preface to Tsong khapa’s Illumination of the Thought

Tsong khapa’s (1357-1419) text Illumination of the Thought, An Extensive Explanation of Candrakirti’s (600-50) Supplement to the ’Middle Way’ hereafter Illumination, is a commentary on Candrakirti’s (7th CE) Madhyamakavatara, which in turn is a commentary on Nagarjuna’s (2nd CE) seminal Mahayana treatise The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamakakarika). Mulamadhyamakakarika is a text revered by many schools of Buddhist thought, and Nagarjuna is regarded by the Western philosophical tradition as a great philosopher in his own right. In fact, many, if not all Western university philosophy departments provide courses on Nagarjuna’s philosophy.

Before we move onto our critical examination of Tsong khapa’s Illumination of the Thought, let’s take a very quick look at the historical lineage of Madhyamaka philosophical thought, in order to get a high level overview and perhaps some insight into the motivations behind Tsong khapa’s Illumination.

Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika is a treatise on Buddhist metaphysics, that is, emptiness. Emptiness is a technical Buddhist term for those unaware that describes phenomena’s ultimate nature. Of course, like so much in philosophy its meaning is hotly disputed. Moreover, perhaps one of the reasons for this is that it is supposedly ineffable. However, following Tsong khapa’s lead, I find this explanation dubious at best, for if the ultimate nature of phenomena, that is emptiness, is its actual nature, surely it can be described? I do concede though, this is perhaps not that easy, given its rather abstruse nature.

Mulamadhyamakakarika is divided into 27 chapters. Each chapter examining a given phenomena’s ontology. The early chapters deals mostly with basic metaphysical categories like causation, time, and agency. While in the later chapters Nagarjuna begins to move away from simply negating others’ concepts to put forward some assertions such as the theory of emptiness.

Mulamadhyamakakarika is known for its rather difficult and vague language, in fact, many philosophers from the 2nd CE to the present day have taken Nagarjuna to be a nihilist. Take for instance the following verse:

Neither from itself nor from other,
Nor from both,
Nor without a cause,
Does anything,whatever, anywhere arise. 1:1

and

Everything is real and is not real,
Both real and not real,
Neither real nor not real.
This is Lord Buddha’s teaching. 18:8

These verses, if read without proper explanation can easily be mistaken as nihilistic. However, they are not, and Nagarjuna goes on to say in a famous verse from the chapter on the examination of the Four Noble Truths:

Whatever is dependently co-arisen
That is explained to be emptiness.
That, being a dependent designation,
Is itself the ‘Middle Way’. 24:18

Tsong khapa’s reading of this verse is: emptiness and dependent arising are two natures of one and the same phenomena. However, let’s not get ahead of ourselves.

Moving on to Candrakirti’s treatise Supplement to the ‘Middle Way’. This text is both a commentary on Mulamadhyamakakarika and a philosophical treatise in its own right, because of its additional material acting as supplementary material clarifying Nagarjuna’s treatise. It does this in two ways.

Firstly, because some interpreted Nagarjuna’s philosophy as nihilistic, believing that Nagarjuna refuted the existence of self and phenomena rather than its superimposed inherent existence – Mulamadhyamakakarika employed reductio ad absurdum arguments to refute inherent existence – Candrakirti sort to explicitly present all the methods required to achieve Buddhahood, such as compassion, patience and so forth. At the beginning of his Supplement Candrakirti pays homage to compassion by emphasizing the need to nourish its development from the initial stages of the path through to its culmination at the time of Buddhahood. By paying homage to compassion rather than the Buddha or one’s guru as is customary, he also emphasizes the need for compassion, and shows us that compassion is the principal distinguishing feature of Bodhisattvas. This can be seen from the first two verses of the Supplement:

Hearers and middling realizers of suchness are born from the mighty subduers,
Buddhas are born from the bodhisattvas;
Compassionate mind, non-dual awareness and
Bodhichitta are the causes of the Conqueror’s children.

Since mercy itself is accepted as the seed of this excellent harvest
Of the conquerors, as water for development and
Like the ripening in a state of long enjoyment,
I therefore praise compassion at the beginning.

Secondly, Candrakirti supplements the Mulamadhyamakakarika by clarifying Nagarjuna’s intention and shows it should not be interpreted according to the Mind-Only (Chittamatra, sems tsam) system nor the Svatantrika-Madhyamika (dbu ma rang rgyud pa) system founded by Bhavaviveka. Candrakirti is held by many including Tsong khapa to be the founder of the Prasangika-Madhyamika (dbu ma thal ‘gyur pa) philosophical system, and Madhyamakavatara is the main sourcebook (yig cha) by most of the Tibetan monastic colleges in their studies of the philosophy of the Madhyamaka school founded by Nagarjuna.

Tsong khapa’s Illumination is a systematic exegesis of Candrakirti’s Supplement, and it is Tsong khapa’s hermeneutics that we are concerned with here. Once the Supplement is understood through the lens of Tsong khapa’s analysis, this knowledge can be read back into Mulamadhyamakakarika thus bringing to life the brilliance of Nagarjuna’s ‘Middle Way’ philosophy.

In the next article we will begin our analysis of Illumination of the Thought. I imagine this will run over a series of posts. In fact, I think I will do one post for every chapter, except for chapter six as it makes up most of the actual text.

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Who was Tsong khapa and Why is He an Important Philosopher?

As you may know, I believe that Tsong khapa is an important philosopher, not only to the Buddhist tradition. This is because both as Mark Siderits puts it:

“Western analytic philosophy and Buddhist philosophy share a fundamental commitment to trying to attain complete clarity about the matters they investigate:”. Prof. Mark Siderits – Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy.

As part of the ongoing research note taking method (see here for details) I will be employing here I thought it prudent that I share with you a little about Je Tsong khapa. The following is lifted from an unused section of my PhD entry paper which you can read here Tsong khapa’s theory of persons.

I believe the critical study of Tsong khapa has much to offer western philosophy and western university faculties, and if you would like to ride along as I detail my investigation, please subscribe to the RSS feed or the newsletter to the right of screen.

A Little Bit About Je Tsong khapa

Tsong khapa founder of the Gelugpa (dGe lugs) school of Tibetan Buddhism was born in 1357 in the Tsongkha valley of Amdo province in northeast Tibet. Tsong khapa is arguably Tibet’s greatest philosopher, with his writing extending into eighteen volumes. He was also a poet, monastic reformer and a great meditator, spending many years meditating in caves throughout Tibet.

His early life was filled with study and meditation practice. He received the ordination of a novice monk at the age of eight and was given the name Losang Drakpa (blo bzang grags pa). At sixteen, Tsong khapa left Amdo to pursue his studies in central and southern Tibet. Initially concentrating on the Perfection of Wisdom sutras and the five treatises of Maitreya, he gained rigorous intellectual training and a wide knowledge of both sutra and tantra during this period. From his twenty-second year he began to study the works on valid cognition (pramana, tshad ma) by Dignaga (5th CE)  and Dharmakirti (7th CE). He was deeply impressed by the efficacy of Dharmakirti’s system of epistemology and logic. During Tsong khapa’s later years he devoted much of his time and energy giving extensive teachings before passing away in 1419.

Tsong khapa’s impact on the development of Buddhist thought cannot be underestimated. His teachings spread throughout Tibet and extended into Mongolia, China and now to the west. He wrote prolifically on both sutra and tantra and his writing style is known for its clarity and elegance. Many of his best known works have been translated into English and remain illuminating, relevant and accessible to this day.

Tsong khapa’s legacy is profound. He established the Great Prayer Festival in Lhasa in 1409, a tradition that continues today. The revitalization of the monastic tradition in Tibet is largely due to his efforts, and he was instrumental in establishing many of Tibet’s greatest monastic universities including, the three great monasteries of Ganden, Drepung and Sera. But perhaps his largest legacy and one that is most relevant for us here, culminated during a retreat in the late spring of 1398.

Late one night, Tsong khapa dreamt he was present at a gathering of famous Indian masters who were discussing the subtleties of the Madhyamika view. Present included Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita, Bhavaviveka and Candrakirti. At one point in the dream, Buddhapalita rose and holding his commentary of Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika in his hands, approached Tsong khapa blessing him by touching his head with the text. The following morning Tsong khapa woke at dawn. Immediately remembering the dream he proceeded to open his own Tibetan translation of Buddhapalita’s commentary at the page he had been reading the previous day. When Tsong khapa re-read the same passage from the previous day he experienced a deep insight into the nature of reality. He saw for the first time, the nature of the two truths and how persons and phenomena although lacking intrinsic essence, nonetheless exist conventionally.

However, Tsong khapa’s overall enterprise and in particular his insight into the illusory-like nature of persons and phenomena is about solving the problem of existential suffering. The solution to this problem is found in the extirpation of ignorance – the ignorance that reifies essence in things and functions as the root cause of suffering. It is the root of suffering, as it pervades the cognitive process for ordinary unenlightened beings propelling them into dysfunctional actions. His insight into the two-fold nature of persons and phenomena is soteriologically efficacious, both within the domain of the conventional and the domain of the ultimate nature of persons and phenomena, because it is this very authoritative cognitive process apprehending their illusory-like nature, which is the mechanism for the extirpation of ignorance.

Thus, much of Tsong khapa’s philosophical pondering was spent asking questions about the nature of the Two Truths. However, western philosophical questions on personal identity such as; what does it mean to be a person? Or in what sense can we say that today’s “I” is the same as the “I” of yesterday are just as relevant. For Tsong Khapa, persons and phenomena are illusory-like because the conventional cognitive process and that which it apprehends, are co-created and mutually supporting, within the scope of that which accords with the conventions of the world. Although persons and phenomena appear to possess intrinsic essence, when analyzed to find this essence which so vividly appears to us, it cannot be found. Therefore, Tsong Khapa’s philosophical exegesis interests me because I think he, more than any other philosopher, understood Candrakirti’s analysis of Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika, took the soteriological significance of conventional truth seriously, and paid particular attention to its articulation.

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Domain of the Illusory: Tsong khapa’s Theory of Illusory-like Persons

Introduction

Persons, according to Tsong khapa (1357 – 1419) are illusory-like. They are illusory-like because while existing truly in one sense, they are nonetheless thoroughly unreal. For superior beings (arya, ‘phags pa) this seemingly paradoxical statement is in fact a straightforward description of how persons exist in reality. Ordinary beings however, do not apprehend persons as illusory-like. Instead they appear as if ultimately real, existing by way of their own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa) and established through their own power (rang dbang du grub pa). For Tsong khapa these appearances of real persons are false, deceptive and that which perpetuates suffering.

Tsong khapa is the founder of the Gelugpa (dGe lugs) school of Tibetan Buddhism and was born in the Tsongkha valley of Amdo province in northeast Tibet. He is arguably Tibet’s greatest philosopher with his writing extending into eighteen volumes, much of which has been translated into English . He was also a great poet, monastic reformer and meditator, spending many years meditating in caves throughout Tibet.
Tsong khapa’s overall philosophical enterprise and in particular his insight into the illusory-like nature of persons and phenomena is about solving the problem of existential suffering. According to Tsong khapa the solution to this problem is found in the extirpation of the ignorance that reifies intrinsic essence in things and which functions as the root cause of existential suffering. The conception that reifies essence in persons and phenomena is the root of suffering, as it pervades the cognitive process of ordinary unenlightened beings propelling them into dysfunctional actions. This misconception empowers dysfunctional actions in a self-perpetuating cycle of false appearances and dysfunctional actions. Therefore, his insight into the two-fold illusory-like nature of persons is soteriologically efficacious, both within the domain of the conventional and ultimate nature of persons, because it is the cognitive process apprehending their illusory-like nature, which is the mechanism of the extirpation of primal ignorance, the ignorance which binds ordinary beings to an unenlightened existence.

Much of Tsong khapa’s philosophical pondering was spent enquiring into the two-fold illusory-like nature of persons and phenomena and asking questions such as: what does it mean to be a person? In what sense can we say that today’s “I” is the same as the “I” of yesterday and so on. Therefore, Tsong khapa’s philosophical exegesis of the two-fold illusory-like nature of persons interests me because I think he, more than any other Tibetan philosopher, understood Candrakirti’s analysis of Nagarjuna’s Mulamadhyamakakarika, took the soteriological significance of conventional truth seriously, and paid particular attention to its articulation.

In this essay, I will argue, not only did Tsong khapa correctly understand the Nagarjuna and Candrakirti emptiness thesis put forward in their Madhyamaka treatises Mulamadhyamakakarika and Madhyamakavatara respectively, but he also added considerably to the debate on the nature of the two truths and personal identity, by positing validly established conventional persons and phenomena. I will defend Tsong Khapa’s theory of illusory-like persons and show that not only is his presentation correct, but that positing intrinsic essence in persons is incoherent. I will also argue, that although intrinsic essence in persons and phenomena does not exist within either domain of the two truths, still nonexistence does not follow. I will do this by arguing that illusory-like persons and phenomena can be validly established within the domain of what the world holds to exist, and that persons and phenomena are not simply mere fictional constructs of a deluded ignorant mind or utterly false and deceptive appearances.

Establishing the Real

Nagarjuna in the first verse of the XVII chapter of Mulamadhyamakakarika says:

If the self were the aggregates, it would have arising and ceasing.
If it were different from the aggregates, it would not have the characteristics of the aggregates.

And in Ocean of Reasoning Tsong khapa says:

If the self – the object of self-grasping – existed inherently, one could not escape two alternatives regarding its mode of existence. Thus we should analyse to determine whether it, through its own characteristics, is identical to or different from the aggregates.

If the self and the aggregates had the same nature, or if the self and the aggregates were entirely different in nature, many incoherent consequences would follow . For Tsong khapa, if the person or self were to possess intrinsic essence or existed inherently, a conventional cognitive process would necessarily establish it at the time of analysing to find such a self. Tsong khapa asserts, since it is not found as one with its parts or separate from its parts, it does not possess intrinsic essence or as Tsong Khapa says: a self of persons is empty of inherent existence.

Self (bdag), I (nga), person (gang zag) and being (skyes bu) are all synonymous. When Tsong khapa speaks of a self of persons or self-identity (gang zag gi bdag), he is not referring to the valid conventionally existent self, merely imputed in dependence on its parts – the psychophysical elements. Rather, self here means intrinsically existent self or inherently existent self, while persons refers to the conventionally or nominally existent self. Intrinsic existence or essence or nature (svabhava, rang bzhin) according to Tsong khapa, has the meaning of independence (rang stobs bltos pa med pa can) or objective (yul gyi steng nas grub pa) or natural (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa) existence or existence under its own power (rang dbang du grub pa) . Within the various Indian and Tibetan philosophical literature, there are up to twelve different meanings of the term nature or essence . Out of these twelve different meanings of nature (svabhava, rang bzhin), Tsong khapa is mainly concerned with a fabricated nature such as the heat of fire, a non-existent object-to-be-negated nature (dgag bya’i rang bzhin) and an existent final nature (rang bzhin chos nyid) or emptiness (shunyata, stong pa nyid). Thus, the term selflessness of persons according to Tsong khapa refers to the non-intrinsic existence of conventionally existent persons or a conventionally existent persons lack of intrinsic essence.

Both Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka treatises have used the famed chariot example to illustrate how phenomena exist as mere imputations; existing in dependence on their parts and thus, chariots do not exist intrinsically or inherently. In Tsong Khapa’s philosophical treatise Lam rim chen mo (byang chub lam gyi rim pa chen mo) , he cites Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara:

A chariot is neither asserted to be other than its parts, nor to be non-other. It does not possess them. It does not depend on the parts and the parts do not depend on it. It is neither the mere collection of the parts, nor is it their shape. It is like this.

Tsong khapa says it is easier to understand the selflessness of persons by first understanding a chariots imputational nature. But for the chariot analysis to be successful it is vital to establish the pervasion of the seven-fold analysis by the predicate of the thesis. That is, in order to understand the selflessness of persons and phenomena, it is vital to understand that if the self, I, person or being possessed independent, objective, natural or intrinsic essence, it would need to exist in one of these seven ways. If such a self cannot be found it follows that it does not exist in that way i.e. inherently or intrinsically.

Let us now turn to the first of the seven-fold analysis. The first of these is: (1) the chariot does not exist as one with its parts. Tsong khapa says: the chariot is not intrinsically one with its parts, such as the axle, wheels, nails and so forth. If it were it would follow, that just as there are many parts to a chariot so too would there be many chariots. Another consequence if the chariot existed as one with its parts would be just as there is only one chariot there would be only one part of the chariot . Let’s now apply this reasoning to our current analysis of persons.

If a self existed as one with its parts, it would follow that just as there are many parts to a person such as the head, arms, thoughts and feelings, there would be many selves or persons. However, we don’t naturally apprehend more than one self. Therefore, if there is only one person that is one with its parts, there must be only one part of that person. This would render such statements as “I hurt my toe” meaningless, as the toe would be the self and the self would be the toe. One could argue however, that when we stub our toe, we naturally think we have hurt ourselves, as if our toe is one with our self. We naturally think, “I hurt myself” while grasping our toe in our hands. At these times we don’t naturally think of the toe as being something separate from ourselves. While this may be true, it doesn’t follow from this that the self is pervaded by being one with the body, for if it were, the feeling of pain in the toe and the conventional cognitive process apprehending that pain would be one and the same process.

Moreover, if someone were to enquire as to what the problem was, we could not naturally point to our toe and say, “I stubbed my toe and it hurts!” for we would in fact be pointing at a self not a toe. Also, if the self were intrinsically one with its parts, we could isolate each part to analyse that particular part to see if it is in fact the self. We could isolate our head to analyse its ontology, however, upon doing so, it is clear that the head is not a self or a person; it is a head. The arms are not a self or a person; they are arms. So it follows when we isolate each part separately, if the self existed it would be found during this analytic process. However, according to Tsong khapa, such a self is not found and is therefore refuted as being one with its parts. We can see from this analysis that the psychophysical elements, which are the basis of imputation for a self, are not a self.

The next premise of the seven-fold analysis is: (2) the chariot does not exist separate from its parts. For Tsong khapa, if a chariot and its parts were intrinsically separate like pot and cloth, just as a pot and a cloth can be apprehended separately, so too could the chariot and its parts .

If the self were intrinsically separate from its parts, Tsong khapa asserts, it would be possible to use a conventional analytic process to apprehend the self. This is because the self and its parts would be two distinct phenomena, intrinsically separate. They would be two distinct entities with two distinct ontologies, observable and findable. Using a similar process as before, we could isolate each part of the psychophysical elements to search for this self existing somewhere among its parts, just waiting for us to find it. Yet such a process according to Tsong khapa does not result in the apprehension of a self and thus no self is found. Therefore, the self or person does not exist intrinsically separate from the parts. Moreover, if the self and its parts were intrinsically separate, there would be no logical reason to impute self in relation to its parts. For Tsong khapa, a self that existed separate from its parts, being a separate entity would be unrelated to its parts. If the self and its parts were intrinsically separate entities and therefore unrelated, the following consequences would follow. It would be impossible to make such statements as “I hurt myself” or “I hurt my tongue” when drinking hot tea. This is because the person doing the drinking and the parts, such as the lips, mouth, or tongue are unrelated because of being intrinsically different entities. It would not be the self that is feeling pain, but rather the lips or tongue. Therefore statements such as “I burnt myself” would be meaningless at best. It follows that the self does not exist separate from its parts because there needs to be a functioning relationship between the self and its parts in order for these statements to be meaningful.

Let us now move onto the third of the seven-fold analysis: (3) the chariot does not possess its parts. For Tsong khapa the possibility of intrinsic possession is also untenable. He asserts:

If you hold that a chariot possesses its parts like Devadatta possesses oxen i.e., as objects other than himself – then just as oxen and Devadatta are seen separately, a chariot and its parts should likewise be seen separately, yet they are not.

According to Tsong khapa, if there were a self that intrinsically possessed its parts it would be by way of either a separate entity, like a person and his car or as the same entity, as in a person and his ear. If there were a real and findable self that is the possessor of its parts, this would entail that the possessor was either one with that possessed and this would entail sameness of entity, or separate from that possessed and this would entail difference of entity. From sameness of entity, it follows that the self could be found by simply isolating each part to investigate whether it is in fact a self or a person. From otherness of entity follows the possibility of the apprehension of the self without the need of its parts. If this were the case, it would be possible for others to apprehend “Loden Jinpa” without the apprehension of some part of my body or the sounds of my voice. Clearly this is not possible.
Someone could raise an objection here: if I do not possess my parts, how can I speak of them? How can I say, “I burnt my lip on this hot cup of tea” if the self does not possess its parts? However, the arguer is conflating mere possession and the possession of parts by an intrinsically existent self. Tsong khapa is arguing for the nonexistence of an intrinsically existent self, not whether a person has lips, nor whether a statement such as “I burnt my lip” has functionality.

We will cover the next two together: (4) the chariot is not the basis for its parts and (5) the chariot is not dependent on its parts. Tsong khapa says in Lam rim chen mo:

A chariot is not the basis for its parts, like a bowl holding yogurt, nor does it rest in its parts, like Devadatta in a tent… because such relationships could be demonstrated only if a chariot and its parts were essentially separate.

Mere mutual existence is not being refuted here. For Tsong khapa, what is being refuted is the misconception that an inherently existent self or a self with essence, exists as either the basis for its parts or depends on its parts for its existence. For Tsong khapa the assertion that the self is either the basis for its parts or is dependent on its parts for existence would entail inherent otherness and therefore a difference of entity. Moreover, if the self were the basis for its parts, at what point in time did the self and its parts begin this relationship, during conception or perhaps during the gestation period? Also, how could a self that is either the basis for its parts or is dependent on its parts for existence, be the basis for both physical and non-physical properties ? If the self were the basis for its parts or dependent on its parts, it would follow that organ replacement would either be impossible or would result in one set of the body-mind complex having two selves. This is because the self of one person would be dependent on the parts of another person for its existence. Therefore the self post-organ transplant would either be an entirely new person or there would be two people existing within one mind-body configuration.

The sixth of the seven-fold analysis is: (6) the chariot is not the collection of its parts. At this point the mere collection of parts of a chariot are posited to be the chariot. However, this is also untenable for Tsong khapa because if this were the case, it follows that the collection of the parts of the chariot aggregated in a different order or even lying in a heap on the ground would be the chariot .
There are Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems that posit the self to be the mere collection of the body-mind complex . However, if the self were the mere collection of the psychophysical elements, just as the body and mind are constantly changing, the self would also be in a state of constant change. From this it would follow: the self of one moment would be entirely different from the self of the next moment, because if an intrinsically existent self that is changing each moment and exists under its own power exists would be unrelated to the self of the next moment because of being an entirely different self. Therefore, statements such as “I remember a time when…” would be impossible, for the self doing the remembering would be remembering an event related to a different self.

Someone might raise an objection at this point by saying: it is not the mere collection of the parts, but rather a particular configuration of parts that make the mere collection, the self. Yet from this position the following would occur. Let’s say you had a dog called, Lucky. Lucky is a healthy dog with four legs, a tail and all the right parts in the correct order and therefore according to you a dog called Lucky. One day Lucky gets hit by a car and has one leg removed, yet survives to see another day and becomes, Lucky – the three-legged dog. Although Lucky was not so lucky that day, he is still Lucky the dog, the same dog as before, albeit minus a leg. But according to the position of the above objector, Lucky was the mere collection of his parts prior to the accident, that is, according the objector: Lucky was the mere collection of four legs, a tail and so forth. It follows from this that the mere collection of parts in a certain configuration cannot be the self, otherwise pre-accident Lucky would either no longer exist or post-accident Lucky would be an entirely new dog.

The last of the seven-fold analysis is: (7) the chariot is not the shape of its parts. If the chariot were the shape of its parts, one could ask as Tsong khapa does, “…is the chariot the shape of the individual parts or the shape of the collection?” If it is the former, it follows that the chariot is the shape of both an axle and a wheel at once . If it is the latter, then the “Lucky dog” argument ensues, because it would be possible to remove certain parts of the chariot, while leaving the chariot functional.

Turning the last of the seven-fold analysis to our current investigation of persons: if the self were the shape of its parts, would the self be the shape of the individual parts or the shape of their aggregation? If it is the former, it follows that the self is the shape of both the arms and legs at once. If it is the latter, then the “Lucky dog” argument ensues, because it would be possible to remove certain parts of person, thereby changing the shape of the collection, without killing that person or creating an entirely new person.

Someone could argue that, although the parts of the self have their own shape prior to their assembly, once assembled correctly, a self appears as the shape of its parts. However from this position the following would entail: the shape of the parts would be something other than the parts, because the shape has come into being after the assembly of the parts in a particular configuration. That is, the assembly was the preceding cause for the generation of the shape. If that were the case, it would be possible to find this self, which would be a shape when searched for. Simply put, the self is not the shape of its parts because the shape of its parts is a shape not a self. Moreover, what shape is there that can think, “I am hungry”? Clearly a self that is the shape of its parts doesn’t even exist conventionally.

After completing the seven-fold analysis some conclude that because one searches for a self but cannot find a self, no self exists. Because for them the self would be utterly non-existent, statements such as “this is my chariot!” or “I remember such and such a time” would be utterly meaningless. They fail to see how a self, person or self-identity can exist and function, if there is not some part or a collection of parts that is the agent or a kind of proxy for a so-called real self. For this reason they feel the need to reduce the self to either a single constituent of the psychophysical elements such as the mind or their mere collection. They claim that if there is nothing with intrinsic, inherent, or natural essence that can act as an agent for a self, then nihilism would follow and this is something that all Buddhists wish to avoid.

However the above analytic process searching for an intrinsic self does not affirm the utter non-existence of a self; rather it affirms the non-existence of a particular kind of self, one that for Tsong khapa has never existed, that is, an intrinsically existent self. For Tsong khapa, a self or person possessing intrinsic essence has never existed and will never exist, at either the ultimate or conventional levels . Moreover, for Tsong khapa not only is an intrinsic self a nonexistent, so too are its parts. For instance, if we were to take a part that is the basis of imputation of the self, such as the head or thoughts, and submit it to the same seven-fold analysis, it too could not be found existing as one with its parts or separate from them. Accordingly Tsong khapa asserts: persons and phenomena are equally empty of intrinsic existence.

For Tsong khapa the above misconceptions are examples of not correctly identifying the object of negation in Madhyamaka dialectics. What is being negated, under the ultimate cognitive process, is not a conventionally existent self but rather an intrinsic, inherent or naturally existent self, that exists under its own power (rang dbang du grub pa) or is established by way of its own entity (ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa). It is the referent of the conception that thinks there is or needs to be a truly existent self in order for memories and so forth to function. It is the cognitive process misapprehending the conventionally existent I that binds one to cyclic existence (samsara, ‘khor ba). Therefore according to Tsong khapa, its opposite, the cognitive process apprehending the negation of an intrinsically existent self, a self with intrinsic essence, is soteriologically efficacious, because it is this very authoritative ultimate cognitive process that is the mechanism of the extirpation of primal ignorance, the ignorance that grasps essence in things and is the root casue of existential suffering.

Therefore, the importance of correctly identifying the object of negation is vital in Tsong khapa’s dialectic. If one under negates, subtle psychological misconceptions grasping at an intrinsically existent “I” or “mine” will remain within one’s mental continuum, and it is these misconceptions that obstruct enlightenment. While if one over negates by thinking “if a self of persons cannot be found when searched for in the above seven-fold analysis, it follows that such a self does not exist” will according to Tsong khapa, lead to negative actions (karma, las). The misconception that a self of persons is utterly nonexistent further obscures enlightenment as ones thorough misunderstanding of the nature of persons is reinforced. Moreover thinking in this way, according to Tsong khapa, renders both the path that leads to and the goal of practice, non-existent.

By using the seven-fold analysis, Tsong khapa asserts it is easy to understand how a person exists as a dependent arising, merely imputed in dependence on its parts. Mere imputation leaves intact conventional functionality without the need of affirming an intrinsic agent. Thus, according to Tsong khapa, to speak of a self, person or I existing as either one with the psychophysical elements or separate to them, not only contravenes conventional usage but, also steps outside of the scope of conventional logic.

Establishing the Unreal

So far we have established that, according to Tsong khapa, if a self along with its constituent parts were to exist outside the domain of mere worldly conventions, such a self could be found existing in one of the above seven ways. We have also seen the importance of the conventional in Tsong khapa’s dialectics. If things were utterly non-existent both the ultimate and conventional cognitive processes that lead a practitioner along the path to enlightenment, being conventionalities would also be non-existent. Given this claim, let us now turn our attention to Tsong khapa’s theory of conventional persons and phenomena. How does Tsong khapa delineate conventional truth (samvrti, kun rdzob bden pa) and how does he reconcile his position with Candrakirti’s claim that conventional truths are in fact false and deceptive.

Tsong khapa, in his discussions on conventionalities in Lam rim chen mo, cites Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara saying:

The chariot is not established in the seven ways, either in reality or for the world. Yet without analysis, just for the world, it is imputed in dependence upon its parts.

For Tsong khapa this verse has the following meaning: when the chariot is searched for using the seven-fold method the chariot is not established. This is because under reasoned analysis at both the ultimate and conventional levels such a chariot cannot be found. Most importantly however, when reason fails to establish the chariot as one with its parts, separate from them and so on, this does not refute the chariot’s mere existence. As Tsong khapa goes on to say:
Reasoning that analyses whether things intrinsically exist does not establish the assertion of the chariot; rather, leaving reasoned analysis aside, it is established by a mere, unimpaired, ordinary, conventional i.e., worldly – consciousness.
For Tsong khapa, the chariot’s mere existence is established by means of a conventional cognitive process imputing ‘chariot’ in dependence on what worldly conventions constitute as being the parts of a chariot. The purpose for the phrase ‘in dependence on what worldly conventions constitute as being the parts of a chariot’ is to rule out the possibility of mere subjective imputation. Mere subjective imputation would allow the imputation of horse to the parts of a donkey. Tsong khapa is not asserting mere subjective imputation. In pan-Mahayana parlance the imputational existence of a chariot and the a chariot’s lack of intrinsic essence or inherent existence is laid out as the doctrine of the two truths – an ultimate truth (paramarthasatya, dom dam bden pa) and a conventional truth (samvrti, kun rdzob bden pa).

Tsong khapa, closely following Candrakirti, articulates the ontology of phenomena by positing the two truths as two natures (ngo bo) of one and the same entity. The claim that the two truths are two natures plays a large role in Tsong khapa’s theory of how conventional truths can be false, deceptive and yet a truth. Moreover, his claim that ultimate truth is both a non-affirming negation and is itself also empty of intrinsic essence relies on the two truths being two natures of the same entity.

In Ocean of Reasoning Tsong khapa quotes Candrakirti:

Through seeing all phenomena both as real and as unreal, the two natures of the objects that are found are grasped. The object of the perception of reality is the way things really are. That which is seen falsely is called the conventional truth.

For Tsong khapa, the ultimate reality of the chariot is its ‘essence’; therefore it is called its ‘nature’. He claims that since things such as the shape and color of the chariot are also called its ‘identity’, they are also called its ‘nature’. Accordingly each phenomenon has two distinct natures: a conventional nature that is apprehended by a conventional cognitive process apprehending a phenomena’s false and deceptive appearance, and an ultimate nature that is apprehended by an ultimate cognitive process apprehending phenomena the way they exist in reality, that is, their lack of intrinsic existence .
Although direct cognition of emptiness (stong pa nyid) is the sole domain of Superiors (’phags pa), Tsong khapa rejects any suggestion that phenomena such as a chariot or persons are ultimately true for Superiors, while being deceptively true for ordinary beings (so skye). According to Tsong khapa, phenomena such as a chariot or the self are conventionally true for both Superiors and ordinary beings. A person’s emptiness of intrinsic existence or lack of intrinsic essence is its ultimate reality, its ultimate nature and hence its ultimate truth, while a persons’ imputational nature is its conventional reality or conventional nature, and hence it is its conventional truth. Thus for Tsong khapa, ultimate truth and conventional truth are not only apprehended by two distinct cognitive processes, they are two distinct dimensions of one and the same world .
So that raises the question, if a phenomena’s conventional reality is its ‘nature’ and therefore in a sense true, how can it be false and deceptive? Tsong khapa following Candrakirti puts forward three distinct senses of the term conventional (samvrti, kun rdzob). (1) Samvrti as worldly conventions (’jig rten gyi tha snyad), (2) samvrti as mutually interdependent or mutually supporting (paraparasambhavana, phan tshun brten pa) and (3) samvrti as obstructing suchness (de kho na nyid la sgrib pa). Thupten Jinpa lays out the first and third of these best when he says: samvrti as a worldly convention is “… the valid framework within which language, concepts, logic, and how the conventions of the world operate”, while the third meaning is “… that which obscures the ultimately empty nature of things” . Perhaps the second meaning, samvrti as mutually interdependent, could be rendered as: a groundless matrix of conventional cognitions that are co-created and mutually supporting within the scope of that which accords with the conventions of the world. They are ‘groundless’ in the sense that there is no intrinsic essence or nature within which phenomena are ‘held up’ and established as valid. It is the conventions themselves, which setup the framework within which they operate and it is this same framework, which governs their validity. Worldly conventions are what hold the framework together allowing it to remain functional without the need for some kind of intrinsic substratum from within which they can be established as valid or invalid conventions. They are co-created because the imputed phenomena, its basis of imputation and the cognizing consciousness arise simultaneously. They are mutually supporting and interdependent because without one the other cannot exist.

Let us now take a look at the first of these senses of samvrti, that is “a valid framework within which language, concepts, logic and the conventions of the world operate”. Tsong khapa citing Candrakirti says: “worldly conventions have the character of the object of expression and means of expression, knower and the object known” . For Tsong khapa, worldly conventions should not be understood simply as subjective conventions. This is because worldly conventions include the terms we give things, the six corresponding consciousnesses and their referent objects . Tsong khapa argues this sense of samvrti as worldly conventions should not be taken merely as subjective conventionalities, for if everything were subjective, it would be possible to label a donkey, ‘horse’. Moreover, as Thomas Nagel eloquently says:

“The claim `everything is subjective’ must be nonsense, for it would itself have to be either subjective or objective. But it can’t be objective, since in that case it would be false if true. And it can’t be subjective, because then it would not rule out any objective claim, including the claim that it is objectively false.”

Therefore, the cognitive resources that arise from the mutual contact between the six senses and the six objects are included in this sense of samvrti . Therefore, the second sense of samvrti as mutually interdependent is also included within the first samvrti as worldly conventions. For Tsong khapa it therefore follows, because nothing exists ultimately, yet for the world things function, existence equals conventional existence.

However if existence equals conventional existence one could ask: how can we establish valid conventional phenomena, if phenomenon cannot be found to exist when searched for either as one with or separate from its basis of imputation i.e. its parts? Put another way, how can a conventional cognitive process, be it direct perception or inference, establish an unfindable nonexistent entity? However, according to Tsong khapa, although a self cannot be found among its parts or separate from them, a self or person’s mere existence (kun rdzob tu yod pa) is nonetheless established by the certification of an unimpaired conventional cognitive process apprehending that phenomenon . Although the conventional cognitive process which acts as the certifier of worldly conventions does not exist ultimately, there is no need for a certifier of the certifier because the conventional cognitive process and that which it apprehends are co-created and mutually supporting (phan tshun brten pa).

The apprehension of a coiled piece of rope in dim light as a snake can be said to be in accordance with worldly perspectives. Tsong khapa calls such perceptions that which is known to the conventions of the world. For Tsong khapa the meaning of worldly conventions is therefore equivalent to things that are experienced or arise as intentional objects (dmigs yul) of consciousness. Because cognitive illusions such as rope-snake are commonplace in the world, they form an integral part of our everyday interactions with the world . Therefore, Tsong khapa has a broad understanding of what is meant by conventionality (tha snyad).

Given this rather inclusive presentation of conventionalities, Tsong khapa needs to delineate some distinction between accurate and inaccurate conventional cognitions, otherwise there will be no method to determine what exists and what does not. Tsong khapa does so by using the conventions of the world to do just that. While it is clear that a rope-snake is an object that is experienced, how can the conventions of the world determine whether a rope-snake is an existent (yod pa) or a non-existent (med pa)? Though a snake imputed to an actual snake’s body and a snake imputed to a rope are both empty of intrinsic existence, without any special analysis the common worldly intellect can easily apprehend which one is an imputedly existent phenomena and thus established as an existent (yod pa), and which one is merely an imputation and thus a non-existent (med pa). By simply approaching phenomena to see if the coordination between the basis of imputation and the imputed object are valid, one can determine based on the conventions of the world whether in fact this imputation is correct or not.

As the former can perform the intended worldly functions of a snake while the latter cannot, the conventions of the world are what establish what exists for the world. However, to exist does not mean to exist for thought alone as coordination between the basis of imputation (snake’s body) and the imputed object (snake) is required . For Tsong khapa, it is both a conventional cognitive process that imputes snake, and a conventional cognitive process that referees the coordination of the imputed object (btags chos) – the snake, with its basis of imputation (gdags gzhi) – the mind and body of an actual snake. Therefore, that which is able to perform its intended worldly function and is not repudiated by another conventional cognitive process is a valid conventional phenomenon for Tsong khapa. Although a rope-snake may perform the function of generating fear it cannot actually bite a person. The conventional cognitive process that apprehends rope-snake is therefore considered to be an inaccurate conventional cognition or wrong consciousness (log shes) and the imputed phenomena, the snake, is a non-existent. By seeing the distinction between these two – snake and rope-snake – one can begin to get a sense by what Tsong khapa holds to be the “truth” of the conventional.

Tsong khapa adds yet another criterion for the validity of conventional phenomena. The assertion is as follows: for conventional phenomena to be valid conventional phenomena, they must not be invalidated (gnod pa) by an cognitive process pertaining to the ultimate ontological status of phenomena. However, Tsong khapa himself claims that nothing can withstand ultimate analysis, so how is this third criterion meant to be understood? The inclusion of this third criterion is for the purpose of refuting the claims by Buddhist and non-Buddhist realists who posit, as he puts it:

A partless subject and object, a self, a primal essence, a divine creator – such things are imaginary constructs put forward in the unique assertions of Buddhist and non-Buddhist essentialists. When they posit such, they do so after rational analysis of whether such things essentially exist; they think that this sort of rational analysis will discover these things.

Tsong khapa uses the claims of these realists as a means to determine whether they in fact exist. The realists themselves claim that things such as a self, essence or mind-basis-of-all (kun gzhi rnam shes) can withstand rational analysis, they must therefore agree that others using rational analysis could find these phenomena. For Tsong khapa when analysed in this way, such things cannot withstand such analysis. Therefore the claims of the Realists are refuted. Although Tsong khapa establishes persons and phenomena in dependence on their basis of imputation, as they are not posited as part of a system in which an analysis of whether they are mere conventions or instead have intrinsic, natural or objective existence, his system is not refuted by this third criterion.

While there are things that are so called “known to the world” yet do not exist even conventionally, examples of these according to Tsong khapa are the above misconceptions of intrinsic existence, soul, primal essence, substantially existent “I” and “mine” conceived by the reifying concept of the perishing aggregates, and the referent object (zhen yul) that yesterday’s mountain is today’s mountain, Tsong khapa does not accept everything that is known to the world . Moreover for Tsong khapa and his followers such as Jamyang shaypa (1648-1722), while existence equals conventional existence and are therefore objects of knowledge (shes bya), not all objects of knowledge are necessarily conventional truths . Emptiness (stong pa nyid), for example, while being an object of knowledge is not a conventional truth, because it is that which appears to the ultimate cognitive process analysing a phenomenon’s ultimate ontology. While conventional truth is necessarily (1) samvrti as worldly conventions (’jig rten gyi tha snyad), samvrti as mutually interdependent (phan tshun brten pa), and (3) samvrti as obstructing suchness (de kho na nyid la sgrib pa). Emptiness is not a separate entity from its conventional nature, nor is it an absolute truth in the sense of being intrinsically real, for it too cannot withstand ultimate analysis. Thus, ultimate and conventional truths are different isolates of one and the same entity.

However, it is not that conventional truth is empty of ultimate truth or that ultimate truth is empty of conventional truth. They are simply different isolates of the same phenomena. This then raises the problem of the ‘emptiness of emptiness’. Emptiness of emptiness is the claim that while being the ultimate nature of all phenomena, emptiness itself is not ultimately real in the sense of being an absolute. Perhaps the misconceptions related to the emptiness of emptiness arise because of the infinite regression that this claim entails, or perhaps it is our inability to distinguish the two truths from within their separate cognitive domains simultaneously that leads scholars such as Mark Siderits to provocatively state “the ultimate truth is that there is no ultimate truth” . If Siderits is asserting: ultimately, all phenomena including ultimate truth are conventionalities, then I agree with his assertion. However, if he is saying that ultimate truth is merely another conventional truth simply because it cannot be found under analysis, this is highly problematic, as it seems to be conflating the epistemic domains of the two truths. Nagarjuna’s great insight was in fact that there are two truths, not one.

Let us unpack this a little. If ultimate truth was merely another conventional truth, it would necessarily operate within the domain of conventional cognitions because as Siderits himself is claiming; all that exists is conventional truths and as we have seen, conventional truths have three distinct senses, one of which is that it obscures conventional phenomenon’s imputational nature. Ultimate truth does not have this feature. If it were the case that ultimate truth was merely another conventional truth in disguise then even ordinary people without any philosophical training could apprehend a chariot’s lack of intrinsic existence. Clearly this does not occur. Secondly, although conventional and ultimate truths in one sense are identical, it doesn’t follow that ultimate and conventional truths are similar in every aspect. They differ greatly in some very major ways. By definition conventional truths are conventions and as such they lack stability with regards to their mode of subsistence (yod tshul). For example, a conventional truth exists within the domain of that which accords with the world’s conventions, their meaning can change. For example, a government may decide to change the rules governing traffic lights. Once this new law takes effect the convention that red means stop and green means go is no longer valid. On the other hand, the non-finding of an intrinsic green traffic light is stable in regards to its mode of subsistence. This is because an analytic process investigating to find a green traffic light as either one with its parts, separate from them, the collection or shape of its parts and so forth, will not find a green traffic light. What is found is the ‘non-finding’ of the green traffic light and this is its emptiness. It is how the green traffic light ultimately exists, it is its ultimate reality and hence it is an ultimate truth.

Because the analytic process was not searching for the green traffic light’s ultimate truth but rather a green traffic light, it does not follow that the green traffic light’s ultimate truth is ultimately real. If we were to then turn to find the ultimate truth of the green traffic light this too could not be found. What would be found would be the emptiness of the emptiness of the green traffic light. While emptiness is itself qualified by emptiness and therefore an infinite regression entails, no fallacy follows because the direct cognition of the emptiness of one phenomenon entails the direct cognition of all emptinesses . Thus ultimately, this is how all phenomena exist including emptiness, and hence this non-finding is their ultimate truth. In this regard, the ‘non-finding’ of a green traffic light when placed under ultimate analysis and a green traffic light as a convenient designation are different in more ways than they are similar. Being objects of different kinds of cognition, ultimate and conventional truths reflect different aspects of green traffic lights. The two truths are therefore are very different from one another. But it is true that despite their difference in one sense, they are, in an equally important sense, identical. Emptiness, as we know, is an ultimate truth for Tsong khapa. However, emptiness is the emptiness of intrinsic essence or existence, not existence per se. To exist conventionally means to be empty of intrinsic existence. Ontologically, therefore, the two truths are identical. However the point here is: to know phenomena conventionally is not to know them ultimately, because they are objects of different kinds of knowledge, despite a single identity at a deeper level . Therefore, ultimate truth does not entail there is no ultimate truth but rather, there is no ultimately existent essence in things either ultimately or conventionally, and this is their ultimate truth.

So although illusory forms, mirages, reflections, rope-snakes are alike in appearing to the conventional cognitive process apprehending them, and they are alike in being empty of intrinsic existence, because they can be repudiated by another conventional cognition they are not posited as conventional truths. Although real snakes and such are false and deceptive because they do not exist as they appear, a worldly consciousness cannot understand them as false and deceptive. Because they fall within the scope of the valid framework within which language, concepts, logic, and how the conventions of the world operate, Tsong khapa posits them as truths for the world . Therefore, within the domain of the conventional, it is the epistemic authority of conventional cognitions that governs the distinction between truth and falsehood. While within the domain of the ultimate, it is the epistemic authority of ultimate cognitions that governs the truth about the conventional .

Now we move onto the third sense of samvrti – that which obscures the ultimately empty nature of things. For Tsong khapa, forms, sounds, smells and tangible things appear to sensory consciousness as though they exist by way of their own intrinsic essence, but the intrinsic essence that appears, does not exist even conventionally. If it did, it would be real and therefore findable either as one with its parts or separate from them. Because this appearance is false Tsong khapa asserts that sensory consciousnesses are mistaken, even conventionally. It is in this sense that conventional phenomena are deceptive, for the appearance of true existence obscures the real nature of phenomena, that is, their lack of intrinsic essence or existence.

Although sensory appearances are false and deceptive, Tsong khapa maintains, it is still possible for sensory consciousness to be valid cognitions that posit false objects such as forms, sounds and so forth as mere conventional phenomena. However, all sensory consciousness is mistaken because what appears to a sensory consciousness appears as if it existed from its own side and by way of its own character (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa) yet no such phenomena exists. The nonexistence of a truly existent object (ngo bo nyid kyis grub pa) is established by the cognitive process analysing phenomena to see whether they exist as they appear. As objects are not established as existing the way they appear, they are mistaken with respect to the appearing object (snang yul) . However the engaged-object (’jug yul) does exist.

Given Tsong khapa’s characterisation of the two truths as two dimensions of one and the same phenomenon, if there were no way of establishing the engaged object as a valid conventional existent, it would follow that all conventional phenomena would be completely nonexistent. This would include the conventional cognitive process apprehending these utterly false appearances. This is because, if phenomena such as persons or chariots are established as nonexistent, because they cannot be found when searched for, it follows that the cognitive process that is performing the analysis is also a nonexistent, for it too cannot be found when placed under the same analytic process. It then follows: all conventional phenomena are nonexistent. However, if all conventional phenomena are nonexistent, and because, as we have already seen, ultimate truth does not exist ultimately, this would entail nihilism. But for the claim that nothing exists to be true, it requires at a minimum, something to exist; that is, it requires the truth of the claim that “nothing exists” to exist. However, for Tsong khapa conventional phenomena do exist even though their appearance to ordinary beings is an appearance of a nonexistent essence and thus false. This false appearance in turn obscures the apprehension of phenomenas’ actual nature, that is, their lack of intrinsic essence, and so it is also deceptive.

So although Tsong khapa posits sensory consciousness as mistaken, it is not a contradiction that sensory consciousness is valid yet posits false objects. The example often used to illustrate this is the mirage or the magician’s illusion. The mirage appears as water to an inexperienced traveler, yet it doesn’t exist in the way that it appears. Many Madhyamikas have used this example to illustrate the falsity of conventional truths, and philosophers such as Garfield have used the mirage example to illustrate the validity of conventional truths. As Tsong khapa in lam rim chen mo using the magician’s illusion says:

Conventionally, we assert all phenomena are like a magician’s illusion and are, therefore, false in conventional terms. Still, it is not contradictory to posit them as conventional truths (kun rdzob bden pa, samvrti-satya). [Candrakirti]Because ignorance obscures the nature of phenomena, we call it the concealer (kun rdzob, samvrti). Hence there is no contradiction in something being true for the concealer, that is, ignorance, and false for the conventional consciousness (kun rdzob, samvrti) with which we refute the intrinsic existence in phenomena.

If we are to take these examples as a method to illustrate how it is possible for a false object to also be a truth, albeit conventional, then the following problem would arise. As Garfield says: “A mirage appears to be water, but is in fact empty of water – it is deceptive, and in that sense, a false appearance. On the other hand, a mirage is not nothing; it is a real mirage, just not water” . How are we to understand the example of a mirage put forward to explain how a conventional truth is both a false appearance yet a “truth”? For according to Tsong khapa himself one of the criteria of a valid conventional phenomenon is that it must not be repudiated by another conventional cognition. However, it is clear that both a mirage and a magician’s illusion can be, thus rendering them inaccurate cognitions. According to Tsong khapa’s own criteria they are therefore like a rope-snake, not conventional truths. A real rope, while not possessing intrinsic essence can nonetheless perform the worldly function of rope. On the other hand, rope-snakes cannot bite, mirages cannot quench thirst and illusory elephants cannot trample crops. Thus, they are not valid conventional phenomena and so cannot be posited as such.

If one compares a mirage or a magical illusion to conventional truth, and cites such as an example of conventional truth, this leaves the relationship between the false appearance of intrinsic essence and the underlying phenomenon’s conventional functionality, broken. If we are to take the mirage example literally, then Candrakirti, Tsong khapa and Garfield are suggesting that just like a mirage or a magician’s illusion, conventional truths are without conventional functionality and hence they are not true, but rather completely false. This is because while the appearance of intrinsic water is a nonexistent and so cannot perform the function of water, conventionally existent water that is related to that appearance, does. However, the false appearance of a mirage is unrelated to the conventional functionality of its appearance as water, that is, the relationship between the false appearance of water and its conventional function to quench thirst is broken. As Garfield himself says: “…a mirage is not nothing; it is a real mirage, just not water” . A mirage does not perform the function of quenching thirst rather; it functions to deceive inexperienced desert travelers. Thus, the relationship between the false appearance of a mirage as water, and water’s conventional functionality to quench thirst, is broken. Surely Candrakirti, Tsong khapa and Garfield would be aware of this fact. So why posit such examples? Perhaps the answer lies in the pedagogical domain rather than the epistemic or ontological nature of conventional phenomena. Perhaps what we are being shown here is not that conventional truths are like a mirage, but rather like a mirage we can become thoroughly engaged in the false appearances, believing them to be as they appear, intrinsically real, and then generating fear or desire depending on that appearance, and acting accordingly.

Despite the fact that for ordinary beings the apprehended phenomena of conventional cognitions are false appearances and thus mistaken and deceptive, Tsong khapa asserts that the conventional cognitive process nonetheless certifies the basic entity of their objects of knowledge. If it did not, it would follow that the objects of the world would be nonexistent and this would undermine the soteriological efficacy of Tsong khapa’s philosophical enterprise, as the two truths are two natures of one and the same phenomena. Still, how can the certification of the basic entity of conventional phenomena such as the person, occur if the person cannot be found when searched for among its parts? One may ask: what is it that is being certified? The answer lies in the conceptual framework of the world’s conventions of what it means to be a person and all this entails, such as the ability to think and function as a person. It is the worldly conventions themselves that setup this framework and it is the same framework that delineates what a person is, how a person functions, what it means to be a person and what constituents are required for a certification to be valid. Even the validity of the certification is nothing other than a worldly convention. Thus, the conventional cognitive process is both the certifier and the referee of the certification.

So in a sense the conventional cognitive process, that both sets up and engages in this framework, operates without analysis. It operates only within the context of how given phenomena appear to it. The conventional cognitive process does not analyse to see if phenomena exist as they appear i.e. intrinsically. Tsong khapa calls these conventional cognitions, non-analytical consciousness. Yet as he says “it is not the case that it is utterly non-inquisitive” . This is because the conventional cognitive process operates within the context of how things appear or how they are known to a conventional consciousness. It does not operate via analysis of how things actually exist. Therefore, it is called worldly knowledge . Because persons and phenomena posited by the conventional cognitive process are able to perform their intended worldly functions within the scope of that which accords with the conventions of the world, yet do not possess one shred of intrinsic essence, for Tsong khapa, the conventional world is the domain of the illusory.

Conclusion

Tsong khapa’s Madhyamika dialectics are effective in rendering liberation because of the epistemic authority of conventional cognitions within the domain of the conventional, and the epistemic authority of ultimate cognitions within the domain of the ultimate. In other words, by understanding clearly the two-fold nature of persons and phenomena, we begin to eliminate the various levels of deeply engrained misconceptions about ourselves, thereby moving progressively from an unenlightened to an enlightened perspective. These insights into the two-fold illusory-like nature of persons particularly the non-affirming negation of the ultimate – emptiness, according to Tsong khapa, is what leads to awakening from the slumber of ignorance.

Tsong khapa has shown us that if the self, person or I were to possess real essence, it would follow that an analytic cognitive process could in fact establish a self with essence existing among the psychophysical elements. We have also seen how the seven-fold analysis is an exhaustive presentation of the possible relationship between a self with essence and the psychophysical elements. By following the consequences of the seven-fold analysis, not one with its parts, not separate from its parts and so on, we have seen how such a self possessing essence does not exist in any of these seven ways, and thus is nonexistent.

Yet, although no self can be found, it is clear that for ordinary people the appearance of a self with intrinsic essence does occur. However this appearance is false and deceptive. It is false because persons appear to possess essence, yet do not. It is deceptive because this false appearance obscures persons’ real nature, that is, their imputational nature. Moreover, because persons possess conventional functionality they can be said to exist truly, albeit, merely conventionally, for without truth in conventionalities, snakes could not bite, water could not quench thirst, elephants could not trample crops and persons could not read essays.

See the PDF version for both the Bibliography and related notes

pdf version

Popularity: 14%

First Draft of my PhD Entrance Paper Available

** Updated 2nd October 2008 **

Thanks to the wonderful feedback I have received, i have updated the essay. The changes are minor, although there was some ambiguity in some of the arguments. These arguments have had a revision or two.

Below is a paragraph from the essay I wrote defending Tsong khapa’s theory of illusory-like persons. I’m looking for feedback and comments on the essay so I can improve it before final submission. The quality of the paper is the determining factor on which I will be offered a Masters or a PhD. It is the first draft and it DOES need work.

In this essay, I will argue, not only did Tsong khapa correctly understand the
Nagarjuna and Candrakirti emptiness thesis put forward in their Madhyamaka
treatises Mulamadhyamakakarika and Madhyamakavatara respectfully, but he also
added considerably to the debate on the nature of the two truths, by positing validly
established conventional phenomena. Therefore, I will defend Tsong Khapa’s
theory of illusory-like persons and show that not only is his presentation correct, but
that positing intrinsic essence in persons is incoherent. I will also argue, that
although intrinsic essence in persons and phenomena does not exist within either
domain of the two truths, still nonexistence does not entail. I will do this by arguing
that illusory-like persons and phenomena can be validly established within the
domain of what the world holds to exist, and that persons and phenomena are not
simply mere fictional constructs of a deluded ignorant mind.

Here is the link to the essay in pdf format.

Domain of the Illusory: Tsong khapa’s Theory of Illusory-like Persons

Popularity: 10%

Would You Like a PhD With That?

For those of you who have not yet signed up for the email newsletter. This post is an example of what I will be sending to the email list. So if you are interested in getting this type of content you will need to sign up for the newsletter. For those that are signed up to the newsletter and also received this via email, you will need to unsubscribe from the old list…if you are not sure send me an email and I will check for you.

The reason for the change is I’m looking into doing a PhD in philosophy, so I want a method to separate reader communication and blog content. Until recently I had to post content on the website in order for people to know about an event or something similar. This new method will allow me to keep in contact with  readers and have the website content focused on philosophy, meditation, Buddhism and all that good stuff rather than my dribble about nothing…although some might say in my case these two and mutually inclusive.

My interest in research writing, or what I thought was philosophical style writing, started a while ago. I had become interested in understanding a little of western philosophy after reading an essay by Professor Jay Garfield and watching videos from a conference of Western and Buddhist philosophy scholars. Jay is the guy who translated Tsong Khapa’s Ocean of  Reasoning. His university webpage http://www.smith.edu/philosophy/jgarfield.html (turns out that most professors have them) and I read one of his essays from this page. This led to me to read more essay style papers by professional philosophers, and eventually this style of communication inspired the philosophy as practice post. Somehow I found http://www.h-net.org/~buddhism/ a list for Buddhist scholars and graduate students (you cant get on this list unless you are a professional academic or graduate student but you can read what they are saying). On this list someone asked about remote PhD programs, which led to someone else replying with a link to a page with a pdf file of PhD rules for Australian universities. I still don’t know why but, for some reason I read this document and to my surprise it was possible in some circumstances to gain entry into a PhD program without an undergraduate degree.

So I began to investigate all the how-to stuff, emailed a number of people asking what was probably some pretty naive questions, and in the end I found a list of Australian universities that seemed relevant and sent them all an introduction letter and research proposal.

Below is part of what I originally sent a couple of university here in Australia.

The research will investigate the soteriological efficacy of Tsong Khapa’s Madhyamaka dialectic: How does a non-affirming negation give rise to Buddhist salvation?

Given Tsong Khapa’s unique reading of Candrakiriti, Nagarjuna and the controversy surrounding his presentation of the Two Truths. There is still an unanswered question of whether the Gelugpa’s praxis does in fact lead a spiritual aspirant to Enlightenment.

Tsong Khapa’s followers believe that his dialectical approach gives us a constructive exegesis of Nagarjuna’s thought as set out in his seminal text, The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way (Mulamadhyamakakarika). Tsong Khapa strove to articulate the vision of emptiness and dependent arising as mutually dependant. This has led to Tsong Khapa’s presentation of the Two Truths, as understood by his opponents, to be thoroughly problematic. Some of his opponents believe that Tsong Khapa reifies conventional phenomena, while others believe his view of emptiness is nihilistic, and therefore his presentation falls out of scope of Nagarjuna’s “Middle Way”.

I believe that not only is Tsong Khapa’s hermeneutical strategy coherent, that his articulation of the Two Truths is soteriologically efficacious, i.e. it does indeed lead a spiritual aspirant to Buddhist salvation but, that his articulation of conventionalities, particularly his description of the self or person sheds light on the age old Buddhist question who is it that becomes enlightened, and also current issues in western philosophical thought on the nature of personal identity.

This was received well by most of the universities but, given I had no research academic background and no undergraduate degree of any kind (I first met Geshe Loden part way through an arts degree, then left to concentrate on dharma) I kept being told I “no” “sorry” etc etc. I didn’t believe them, much to the annoyance of a friend who would say…but he (this professor) has 25 years of experience, if he says you can’t get in, then you can’t get in! I don’t know why but, I didn’t believe them (although I can’t see if I will get in, I felt I should at least keep trying…that was the feeling I was getting).

So I tried a couple more different universities and I finally found one university that seemed interested to at least talk. Ok your getting somewhere I thought. After maybe a dozen, or perhaps more emails, this is where I stand…

I have been asked to write an honors degree thesis (16,000 words) within 4 to 8 weeks, I think that honors degree students get 10 months or so but perhaps this is not correct. The university will then evaluate the thesis and I may be offered a place (without a scholarship to start with. PhD study is not courseware so there are no fees…although it is full time work) depending on the quality of the paper.

I would like to document my journey from here to (hopefully) completion of a PhD, so if you are interested to hear (it might be very boring) the story you please sign up to the newsletter. Future blog posts and website content will mainly consist of longer articles and essays on Buddhist related topics.

Popularity: 11%

Discussions on Space from last nights class

For those of you who participated in a discussion on compounded and uncompounded space after the philosophy class last night. I found the reference to my comment that compounded space is an object of eye consciousness. It can be found on page 233 of Meditations on Emptiness by J Hopkins.

Space appears both to an eye consciousness and a mental consciousness and thus the bluish space that appears to an eye consciousness is a visible form whereas the space that appears to a mental consciousness is form a mental consciousness.

I think there is still some room for further discussions on the ontology of uncompunded space.

Popularity: 100%

Is Wisdom Really Necessary In Order To Generate Compassion?

It seems that my assertion from the article Philosophy as Practice raised some eyebrows.

…without the ability to analyze and use critical thinking, even the compassion spoken of in Buddhism cannot be fully developed. Therefore the wisdom lineage, as in “method and wisdom”, pervades the method lineage.

I was surprised by the doubt raised by this statement, as it seems to me to be quite clear. However, in order to practice what I advocate, that is, doing philosophy, since last Thursday when the doubt was surreptitiously raised during a discussion after class. I have been investigating whether this statement is in fact true, or simply an unchallenged assumption on my behalf. I consulted the following texts; Tsong Khapa’s Illumination of the Thought a commentary on Candrakiriti’s Supplement to The Middle Way; Tsong Khapa’s Lamrim Chenmo; Geshe Lhundrup Sopa’s commentary on Lamrim Chenmo.

My argument

First of all, let us revisit the original argument and unpack it into its simplest form.

Premise: Great Compassion cannot be developed without first understanding how sentient beings suffer, how suffering is generated and what are its causes.

Conclusion: You must therefore use analysis and reasoning to investigate the nature of conditioned existence and dependent-arising, in order to develop genuine great compassion.

The contention

However, the doubt that compassion requires wisdom in order to be developed was raised as a question with a slightly altered form. Paraphrasing the question; “Is the wisdom realizing emptiness necessary in order to develop compassion”. Although this is not what I argued, I think this statement might also be a true statement but we probably should leave that debate for another day. So to make it clear then, I am not arguing that ordinary compassion cannot be developed without wisdom or that one must first realize emptiness directly before developing compassion. I am, however, stating that without analyzing how suffering is experienced and what are its causes, it is impossible to develop great compassion. Ordinary compassion is a precursor to great compassion. Great compassion is the compassion that all Bodhisattvas possess, and is therefore the type of compassion we to need to generate.

Ordinary Compassion Vs. Great Compassion

So that begs the question. What is the difference between ordinary compassion and great compassion? I don’t know what the definition of ordinary compassion is, but at a guess, it could perhaps be characterized as; the wish for someone to be free from a manifest pain. Great compassion on the other hand is defined as; the wish for all living beings to be free from suffering and the causes of suffering. The difference is not just in how many beings are within the scope of great compassion but, that great compassion also wishes sentient beings to be free from the causes of suffering. Great compassion, therefore, is not only concerned with manifest pain and suffering, but the potential for it, that is, the causes of suffering. This is an important point and one that should not be glossed over lightly. Great compassion has a subjective aspect that wants to eliminate the potential for suffering. But, how can one wish to eliminate the potential for suffering if you do not know what the causes of that potential are?

If we genuinely want to develop great compassion, we need to understand what it means to suffer. We need to understand how suffering is generated, and most importantly, how to permanently remove it. Initially we do this by inferring our own experiences of manifest pain, be it physical or mental pain, onto others. For example, I see someone experiencing the pain of a headache. I remember the last time I had a headache, and I remember my wish to be free from that experience. I can then infer my experience onto them and the wish for them to be free from that pain is naturally generated. I contend this is ordinary compassion not great compassion. Ordinary compassion is an ability to empathize with others. This type of compassion is beneficial. In fact, without the ability to empathize with others we would not be able to generate great compassion. Please do not think I am belittling ordinary compassion, I am not. I am simply saying it is not the compassion spoken of in Buddhism.

Great compassion on the other hand has additional mental factors naturally occurring or concomitant with the subjective aspect of ordinary compassion.
Kamalasila’s Stages of Meditation says:

When you spontaneously feel compassion which has the subjective aspect to completely eliminate (emphasis added) the suffering of all living beings – just like a mother’s wish to remove her dear child’s unhappiness – then your compassion is complete and is therefore called great compassion.

Levels of suffering

So how do sentient beings suffer? Buddhism enumerates suffering in many different ways. One such presentation is the three levels of suffering.

1: The suffering of suffering: This is manifest pain either in the mind or body.

2: The suffering of change: This is subtler than the first. Put simply, it is the fact that pleasurable experiences carry with them the seeds for dissatisfaction. The bliss experienced from eating chocolate, will if you eat enough in one session, turn into an unpleasant experience.

Geshe Lhundup Sopa says¹:

All worldly pleasures are impure because they contain the seed of misery. They are not perfect sources of delight. From the yogi perspective, therefore, because ordinary enjoyment changes it is actually suffering.

3: Pervasive suffering: Is the suffering of conditioned existence. It is the most subtle and the most difficult of the three to understand.

Just as it would be difficult for someone born into a prison cell who has never seen the ocean, to understand the depth of an ocean. It is difficult for ordinary people to comprehend the depth of our suffering. This does not mean however, we can’t enjoy life. Just as a prisoner can enjoy a cup of tea, so can we. But understand that, just as a prisoner is locked in a cell, we to are locked in the cell of ego-grasping. By knowing this, we are motivated to do something about our situation and the suffering of others.

What are the causes of suffering?

The root cause of suffering is the fundamental ignorance grasping at an inherently-existent self. If we are to generate a wish for all living beings to be free from suffering and its causes, we must understand how we experience these three levels of suffering. For compassion that is spoken of in Buddhism to be fully developed, one must understand all three levels. We must know just how the conception of an inherently-exist self can be the cause of these sufferings. And we must understand the process involved in completely eliminating suffering.

The great Je Tsong Khapa has said²:

After you have thoroughly distinguished the objects of meditation according to the previously explanations – how compassion is the root, how the developments of the spirit of enlightenment is the entrance to the Mahayana, and so forth – you must then analyze these explanations with discerning wisdom and elicit the experience produced after sustaining them in meditation. You will not achieve anything with the unclear experiences that come when you make a short, concentrated effort without precisely clarifying the topic with your understanding. Know that this is true for other kinds of practices as well.

Summary

To completely eliminate suffering, is different than a wish for a living being to be free from a particular manifest suffering such as a headache.
In order to completely eliminate suffering one must eliminate the causes of suffering, otherwise this elimination will remain incomplete as the potential for future suffering is still present. The fundamental or root cause of suffering is ego-grasping. Therefore, you must understand from within your own experience the suffering related to ego-grasping, in order to infer it on others. To have the wish that all living beings be free from suffering and its causes, means you must know how sentient beings suffer and what the causes of that suffering are. Without that understanding your compassion will remain mere empathy.

Footnotes:

1. Steps On The Path To Enlightenment – P91 [go back]
2. Je Tsong Khapa – The Great Treatise and The Stages Of The Path To Enlightenment P45 [go back]

Popularity: 17%

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